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EXPLORING REGIME INTERACTION 
A Framework of Analysis 
THOMAS GEHR1NG AND SEBASTIAN OBERTHÜR 
University of Bamberg: University of Bamberg/Ecologic 
The international system is populated by a steadily growing number of 
international institutions. More than two hundred major regimes exist in the 
field of international environmental protection alone; with five major 
agreements being adopted per year since the 1980s (Beisheim et al. 1999; 
see also Sand 1992). While these institutions usually are separately 
established to respond to particular problems, they increasingly affect each 
others' development and performance. In some cases, "regime interaction" 
creates conflict.1 Whereas the Word Trade Organization (GATTAVTO) 
promotes free international trade, several international environmental 
regimes, such as the Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the Montreal 
Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer, establish new trade restrictions 
(see Petersmann 1993; Lang 1993; Moltke 1997). Likewise, the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change provides 
incentives for establishing fast-growing mono-cultural tree plantations in 
order to maximize carbon sequestration from the atmosphere, whereas the 
Convention on Biological Diversity of 1992 aims at preserving biological 
diversity of forest ecosystems (see Gillespie 1998; WBGU 1998; Tarasofsky 
1999; Pontecorvo 1999). In other cases, interaction creates synergistic 
effects. The global regime on the transboundary movement of hazardous 
wastes has been strengthened, for example, upon the establishment of a 
number of regional regimes addressing the same environmental problem 
(Meinke 1997). 
Traditionally, regime analysts have tended to explore the establishment, 
development, and effectiveness of international regimes in isolation. The 
relevance of the growing "regime density" (Young 1996) that may generate 
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a risk of "treaty congestion" (Brown Weiss 1993: 679) has been recognized 
only recently. Meanwhile, the number of studies investigating specific cases 
of institutional interaction is steadily growing (see, for example, Zhang 
1998; Stokke 1999; Rosendal 2000; Oberthiir 2001; Andersen 2002). These 
contributions focus particularly on environmental regimes because the 
institutional fragmentation of international environmental politics makes 
interaction a particularly widespread phenomenon in this field. Most of the 
research is empirical and descriptive. Despite some attempts to categorize 
phenomena of institutional interaction (Young 1996, 2002; Stokke 2000; 
Herr and Chia 1995; King 1997), the conceptual development of the analysis 
of regime interaction is still at an early stage. Not surprisingly, the influence 
that regimes may have on each others' development and performance has 
been repeatedly identified as a key issue for future research (Young et al. 
1999; Breitmeier 2000; Young 2002). 
This chapter aims at developing a conceptual framework for the analysis 
of interaction between regimes. : It concentrates on situations in which one 
or more international regimes exert influence on one or more other regimes 
or on issue areas related to other regimes. It does not address the impact of 
the growing universe of international institutions on a particular regime, nor 
the effectiveness-related problem of how to attribute an observed impact to 
different regimes. International regimes are considered as social systems that 
comprise, in addition to a catalogue of norms of behavior, a structured and 
institutionalized process of communication in which norms are molded and 
collective decisions made. This concept allows for the identification of the 
boundaries of an international regime on the basis of its specific 
communication process rather than the substantive problem(s) addressed. 
Hence, we may find, for example, a regional and a global regime addressing 
a virtually identical substantive problem, such as dumping of wastes at sea. 
Without further elaborating this concept here (see Gehring in this volume, 
Gehring 1994; Levy et al. 1995), we note that it basically reflects the 
understanding of the term "regime" as most widely used by policy-makers 
and in empirical research. 
Influence between regimes is not limited to cases in which a regime's 
norms and institutional arrangements are modified upon interaction. It 
extends to all three levels of a regime's effectiveness: output, outcome, and 
impact (see Underdal in this volume). A regime will affect another regime's 
normative output if it causes changes of the latter's norms. It will exert 
influence on another regime's outcome if it results in behavioral adaptations 
that are relevant to the latter's performance. Finally, a regime will affect 
another regime at the impact level, if it directly influences the subject matter 
governed by the latter (e.g., the state of the environment in the case of 
environmental regimes). In any case, interaction between regimes is based 
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on a causal link between the source regime(s) and the target regime(s). 
Therefore, it is a core analytical task of studies addressing regime interaction 
to demonstrate that a causal connection exists between the regimes involved. 
Unfortunately, empirical phenomena of regime interaction are frequently 
complex. They may include a whole set of regimes that interact with each 
other, or a co-evolution process in which influence runs back and forth. 
Under these circumstances, the establishment of clear causal pathways 
requires the identification of suitable units of analysis (section 1). Moreover, 
empirical evidence suggests that regime interaction constitutes a rather 
multifaceted phenomenon. Systematic research should be based upon factors 
that may be used to distinguish cases of regime interaction according to 
important criteria. In section 2, we therefore develop a number of conceptual 
categories of regime interaction that allow a systematic mapping of 
empirical cases of regime interaction and a more specific distinction of 
different types of regime interaction. Finally, we address the issue of 
establishing causality in section 3. It is indispensable for every identified 
case of regime interaction to demonstrate a causal pathway that clearly links 
the source regime with the target regime. In the absence of a causal link, 
regimes would merely co-exist, rather than interact. On the basis of the 
development of certain types of regime interaction, it may be possible in the 
longer run to develop generalized causal mechanisms for different patterns 
of interaction that spell out standard causal pathways and the conditions 
under which they become applicable. 
1. CHOOSING THE APPROPRIATE UNIT OF 
ANALYSIS 
While description of observable social phenomena may be a valuable 
task on its own (King et al. 1994: 34 - 74), the analysis of regime 
interaction, like any exploration of regime consequences, is closely related to 
the examination of causal influence. Causal analysis requires the 
identification of one or more independent variables that exert influence on 
one or more dependent variables. It is thus based on the existence of a clear-
cut direction of influence between variables. Moreover, it must allow the 
identification of a causal pathway that generates the observed effect. 
Accordingly, the causal analysis of regime interaction will generally require 
(1) the identification of one or more sources from which influence originates 
(independent variable), (2) the identification of one or more targets that are 
affected by an interaction process (dependent variable), and (3) a causal 
pathway connecting the independent variable to the dependent variable in a 
way that generates the observed effect. 
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Unfortunately, constellations of interacting regimes are frequently highly 
complex. A situation involving several source regimes and/or several target 
regimes connected by varying causal pathways, for example, may be 
described. In this case, however, the causal influence that drives interaction 
cannot be analyzed because it is not possible to identify independent and 
dependent variables. Therefore, such situations do not constitute appropriate 
units of analysis. Serious causal analysis of interaction phenomena requires 
that a complex interaction situation is analytically disaggregated into a 
number of cases of regime interaction. Each of these "cases" must fulfill the 
aforementioned conditions, namely they must allow the identification of a 
single source regime, a single target regime, and a unidirectional causal 
pathway connecting the two. While a case of interaction has to be based 
upon empirical observation, it is an analytical construction that does not 
exist independently of the analysis. 
Disaggregation of complex interaction situations will be particularly 
useful in three cases: if more than one pathway is operative, if interaction 
constitutes a feedback (co-evolution) process, or if it involves a whole set of 
regimes. First, existing international regimes are normally complex. For 
example, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the regime for the 
protection of the Baltic Sea govern broad issue-areas. Even an allegedly 
single-purpose institution such as the regime for the protection of the ozone 
layer controls the use of numerous chemicals and promotes a number of 
different abatement strategies. Moreover, modern international regimes 
regularly comprise auxiliary arrangements, including funding mechanisms 
(Keohane and Levy 1996) and systems of implementation review (Victor et 
al. 1998), that may exert influence on another regime separately from the 
core arrangements of the source regime. Complex international regimes may 
interact with each other in more than one way and interaction will then be 
based on several causal pathways. 
For analytical purposes, we should disaggregate a complex interaction 
situation into a number of suitable cases. We may identify specific 
components of the source regime that have the potential of affecting the 
target regime. Consider the case of the international regimes on climate 
change and for the protection of the ozone layer. One component of the 
Montreal Protocol for the protection of the ozone layer reinforces 
international efforts to combat climate change by prescribing the phase-out 
of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) that do not only harm the ozone layer but are 
also important greenhouse gases. Another component of the ozone regime, 
namely the promotion of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) as substitutes for 
CFCs, affects the climate change regime adversely, because these substances 
are powerful greenhouse gases. Yet another component of the Montreal 
Protocol, its noncompliance procedure, provided a precedent for the 
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elaboration of a similar component of the climate change regime (Oberthiir 
2001), so that interaction was obviously based on a different causal pathway. 
Upon closer inspection, we might identify even more different forms of 
interaction between the two regimes. Interaction between these regimes is 
thus made up of a number of cases with rather different properties. Influence 
may be symmetrical or asymmetrical (Young 1996: 7). 
The separate study of single cause-effect relationships promises to 
provide a much clearer picture of the overall interaction pattern than any 
aggregate analysis could. Obviously, the accuracy of the overall picture will 
increase with the number of cases explored. Constraints on time and money 
suggest that research should start with the most important and direct effects 
and gradually proceed toward cases with a more limited impact on the 
overall situation or with a less clear cause-effect relationship. 
Second, co-evolution processes should also be disaggregated into a set of 
cases of interaction, before they are submitted to causal analysis. As modern 
international regimes exist over extended periods of time and tend to change 
more or less profoundly during their lifetime, the analysis of co-evolution of 
regimes promises important insights into the interaction patterns of regimes. 
For example, the regional Oslo Dumping Convention and the global London 
Dumping Convention co-developed for almost thirty years and appear to 
have been mutually reinforcing (Meinke 2002). If co-evolution involves 
feedback processes, neither of the regimes in question would exist in its 
current state without existence of the other. Influence may be bi-directional. 
We are thus confronted with a problem similar to the co-constitution of 
agent and structure that has been hotly debated in International Relations 
(Wendt 1992; Dessler 1989). Unfortunately, collapsing agent into structure 
and structure into agent (Carlsnaes 1992) renders causal explanation 
virtually impossible because it makes any invariable starting point for 
analytical reasoning disappear (see also Hollis and Smith 1991). Similarly, 
the observation that two or more co-evolving regimes are mutually 
constitutive does not help explain how these regimes exert influence on each 
other. 
Therefore, we should disaggregate the co-evolution process into a 
suitable number of cases of interaction. The principal strategy is 
temporalization and phasing (Archer 1985: Carlsnaes 1992). Despite its 
empirical continuity, we may consider a process of co-evolution as a 
sequence of separate cases, each of them with a single unidirectional line of 
influence running from one of the regimes involved to the other. Cases are 
again best selected according to important decisions, or sets of decisions, 
that establish components of the source regime with possible effects on the 
target regime. In doing so, we implicitly assume that a stable situation exists 
at an appropriate point in time tlh in which neither of the regimes in question 
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is under pressure to adapt. It may not be possible to identify empirically any 
such moment within the overall development of an international regime. 
Nevertheless, with respect to a particular decision or set of decisions, such 
as the decisions to control and phase out CFCs, we will not expect any effect 
before the relevant decisions were adopted (or their adoption was at least 
anticipated). Accordingly, we may observe at point t, an important change 
within Regime A, for example the adoption (or elaboration) of a new set of 
regulations, with a possible effect on Regime B. This effect must inevitably 
occur later than its cause, at point t2. The members of Regime B may react, 
for example, by a collective decision adapting regulations to the new 
situation. Such a response occurs yet another analytical moment later, at 
point t}. 
If we are able to identify any such influence, it will be clearly directed 
from the source regime to the target regime. If influence is symmetrical, it 
will run the other direction in the subsequent phase. Assume that the 
decision adopted by actors of Regime B at point t3 significantly modifies the 
environment of Regime A. This effect will occur yet another analytical 
moment later, at point t4. And it may lead to a further institutional response 
by actors of Regime A, at point t5. Influence is also clearly directed, but it 
runs from Regime B toward Regime A. Hence, we have discovered a 
feedback loop. The original action of Regime A members causes a reaction 
of Regime B actors that feeds back on Regime A. "Co-evolution" of the 
global Basel Convention on the Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes and several related regional regimes may thus be analyzed as a 
sequence of two phases. In the first analytical phase, the establishment of a 
moderate control arrangement at the global level may have caused the 
African countries, and subsequently the countries of other possible target 
regions, to adopt separate regional regimes prohibiting the import of 
hazardous wastes. In the second phase, the existence of a number of such 
regional regimes may have strengthened those favoring a ban of waste 
exports from OECD countries to non-OECD countries that was eventually 
agreed under the global regime (Meinke 2002). Once again, the overall 
interaction pattern is better grasped by the separate exploration of two 
successive cause-effect relationships than in an aggregate perspective. 
Third, interaction within a whole set of regimes may be disentangled into 
a number of bilateral relations of influence. For example, the Baltic Sea is 
affected by a number of functionally different global environmental regimes 
addressing, inter alia, oil pollution from ships and dumping of wastes at sea, 
and by an important regional regime, as well as overall arrangements such as 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) with its 
Exclusive Economic Zones arrangement (Young 1996). It is likely that all 
these institutions interact with each other—either affecting each others' 
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performance or influencing each others' institutional development. We may 
well describe the set of institutions involved. We may even try to assess the 
impact of this set of regimes on the state of the regional common in question 
(which would constitute an analysis of "simple effectiveness," see Underdal 
in this volume). However, we would not learn anything about the causal 
influence between the institutions involved. 
Once again, we should distinguish cases of regime interaction on the 
basis of specific components of the respective source regimes that emerge 
and develop through collective decision making. At closer inspection, we 
may discover rather different patterns of causal influence within a set of 
regimes. For example, a single important decision adopted within a source 
regime may turn out to exert parallel influence on a number of target 
regimes. The decision to ban the dumping of certain wastes at sea, adopted 
under the global London Dumping Convention, might have affected a 
number of regional seas regimes concurrently, although independently of 
each other. On the other hand, a single target regime may be affected by 
different source regimes. We may thus examine separately the influence 
exerted on the development of the Baltic Sea regime by the London 
Dumping Convention, by the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 1973/78) and by the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea. The separate exploration of these individual cases promises 
to reveal a much clearer picture of the interaction pattern than an overall 
perspective could do. 
It is not necessary to elaborate further that these three sources of 
complexity of an interaction situation may occur simultaneously. In the 
extreme, we may have to deal with a whole set of highly complex regimes 
that develop over time. Still, for analytical purposes one may best identify 
appropriate cases of interaction with a clear direction of influence. The 
reason is that the separate analysis of interaction cases will reveal different 
types of interaction and different underlying causal pathways. It may also be 
discovered that causal pathways change over time. Consequently, analyzing 
cases of definite inter-regime influence rather than a complex overall 
situation promises to provide both a better idea of the causal pathways 
determining the interaction and, by means of re-aggregation of the results, a 
better picture of the complex overall situation. 
2. COPING WITH THE MULTIFACETED NATURE 
OF REGIME INTERACTION 
Regime interaction is a comparatively novel field of research. As is 
evident from the existing literature, it covers a broad range of cases with 
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rather different properties, but we do not know very much about the core 
characteristics of these cases. "International regimes" had also once been a 
concept much criticized for its lack of precision (Strange 1982). Today, we 
have a fairly clear idea of what an international regime is, what its functions 
are, of important types of regimes as well as of ways to assess their (simple) 
effectiveness. This knowledge is a result of more than two decades of 
conceptually founded regime analysis. It demonstrates how an originally 
unclear phenomenon may be systematically unfolded through theoretically 
informed research. The exploration of regime interaction still lacks 
conceptually founded guidance on how to deal with the multifaceted and 
empirically complex phenomenon in a similarly systematic way. 
First of all, this theoretical gap raises the problem of how to identify 
cases of regime interaction. A case of regime interaction may be 
comparatively limited in scope and difficult to recognize. So far, the 
empirical—and predominantly descriptive—literature on regime interaction 
tend to focus on areas of eminent interest to policy makers that have been 
primarily related to conflicts between regimes rather than synergy effects. 
To be sure, the perceptions of negotiators and stake-holders constitute an 
important source of information about the existence and nature of a case of 
regime interaction. However, systematic mapping must be based on 
conceptually sound criteria in order to minimize the risk that whole 
categories of interaction or core characteristics of particular cases are not 
taken into account. In short, researchers must develop their own idea of what 
constitutes a case of interaction and its core characteristics. 
Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that it is not useful, or may 
even be epistemologically impossible, to simply describe a case of 
interaction without an idea of its central aspects, because description always 
requires distinguishing between important properties (that are worth 
reporting) and other features (that may be ignored) (King et al. 1994: 42-43). 
Generally, we generate information about our environment through self-
constructed distinctions, internal models, "paradigms," or "theories" that 
allow us to order individual observations. Hence, we would be unable to 
identify cars on a motorway without an idea of how cars are to be 
distinguished from other objects, for example motorcycles. And "cars" 
remains an amorphous category, unless we introduce further distinctions, for 
example between vans, limousines, and station wagons. It appears that any 
systematic study of regime interaction will have to be based on some useful 
distinctions that help identify cases of interaction by pointing toward their 
core characteristics. 
Distinction alone does not suffice. As cars may be distinguished 
according to an almost infinite number of aspects, for instance their color, 
their manufacturer, the size of their steering wheel, we may think of 
EXPLORING REGIME INTERACTION 255 
numerous distinctions between cases of regime interaction. What we need 
are distinctions that presumably tell us something about important 
characteristics, that is those aspects that we believe to be central to cases of 
interaction. Unless we have an idea of how cases involving few actors differ 
systematically from those involving many, the number of relevant actors will 
not be a useful distinction. Likewise, unless we hypothesize that regime 
interaction in the area of environmental protection differs significantly from 
interaction in the areas of the economy or security, we cannot expect to gain 
additional information from this distinction. Hence, useful distinctions are 
supported by plausible hypotheses about the operation of regime interaction. 
Generally, this will be true for any distinction that addresses variation of the 
causal pathways at work because variation of this type promises hints as to 
how interaction operates and why it produces the results observed. 
Distinctions of this sort promise to provide a basis for the inductive 
development of types of regime interaction. While it is still too early and far 
beyond the scope of the present paper to put forward a theory of regime 
interaction, we may well look for categories that have the potential for 
providing a sound basis for theory development. 
The present section first develops a set of generalized distinctions that 
shed light on a number of key properties of cases of regime interaction. 
Second, it briefly explores the utility of these categories for empirical 
analysis. Illustrative reference is made to various cases, particularly in the 
area of environmental policy. However, the categories introduced are of a 
general nature and therefore applicable to all policy areas. 
2.1 Dimensions of Regime Interaction 
Conceptually fruitful criteria for the distinction of cases must address 
particularly important dimensions of regime interaction. Distinctions based 
on factors whose variation might have an impact on the causal pathways at 
work are most likely to be important. In section 1, we have argued that cases 
of regime interaction always involve action within the source regime. This 
action will always produce some consequence within the target regime or the 
issue area governed by it, and may lead to further responses within the 
source and target regimes. We may thus assume that variation of these 
factors of regime interaction, namely source regime action and the resulting 
consequences, matter. However, not every action adopted within an 
international regime exerts influence on a target institution. A third area of 
importance pertains to the situation that links the regimes involved. 
Accordingly, we should look for distinctions related to significant variation 
of (1) situation-specific aspects, (2) the properties of source regime action, 
and (3) the type of consequences and responses. 
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Situation-Specific Causes and Effects. We may expect that some 
characteristics of a case of regime interaction are specific to the situation, 
rather than to source regime action or to the consequence generated. Two 
aspects appear to be particularly relevant in this respect. First, there must be 
situation-specific drivers that provide a basis for influence between the 
regimes involved. Second, we need information about the effects of a case 
on the target regime. We therefore propose two distinctions: one relating to 
the situation-specific causes and the other to the effects. 
The functional interdependence of two or more international regimes and 
the related issue areas has been established as an important driver for regime 
interaction (Young et al. 1999: 50). In this case, two issue areas are related 
by some functional logic. However, in some cases, interacting regimes 
govern issue-areas with a virtually identical substance. Accordingly, we 
have to look for a second driver of regime interaction that may replace 
functional interdependence. We propose that this driver is related to the 
membership of the regimes involved. Empirically, both the substantive issue 
areas and the memberships of the regimes involved vary across cases. Upon 
closer inspection, we find that the issue areas governed are in some cases so 
different that we may expect this variation to be relevant for the causal 
pathway at work, while in other cases the substance addressed is almost 
identical and therefore presumably of little explanatory value. Likewise, in 
some cases we find memberships so clearly distinct from each other that we 
may expect this variation to influence the causal pathways at work, while 
this is not true for other cases. Hence, cases may ideally be driven either by a 
functional logic or by a membership-related logic. We derive a distinction 
between two types of regime interaction, each of which is based on a 
different logic. 
Unless we have an appropriate distinction of the effects generated by a 
case of regime interaction, we may only observe whether a source regime 
indeed affects the target regime, but not in which way. Effects can vary to a 
considerable extent, and we may think of several suitable distinctions. At the 
most basic level, effects may either reinforce or contradict the "policy 
direction" (Gehring 1994: 433 - 49) of the target regime. The policy 
direction indicates the direction of collectively desired change or the 
objective of maintaining a desired status quo against some collectively 
undesired change. Hence, we gain a distinction between cases of interaction 
that produce synergy and cases that cause disruption from the point of view 
of the collectivity of target regime actors (although some members may 
disagree individually). While this distinction is clearly situation-specific, it is 
not immediately related to the causes of interaction. However, it may 
provide important information about the characteristics of cases of regime 
interaction relevant to whether and how it is responded to (section 2.1.4). 
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We may, for example, hypothesize that synergistic effects are frequently 
simply "consumed" without further action because they generate additional 
benefits "free of charge," while disruption creates conflict and will therefore 
produce demand for more beneficial solutions. However, if synergy leads to 
institutional adaptation, it may launch a process of dynamic and mutually 
reinforcing co-development of the regimes involved (see section 1). 
By combining these two dimensions of regime interaction, we derive four 
types of regime interaction depicted in Figure 10.1. In cases that follow a 
functional logic (left side of Figure 10.1), the memberships of the source 
regime and the target regime are basically identical. They raise the question 
of why a group of actors might act within one regime in a way that 
influences its own governing effort within another issue area. This kind of 
interference may occur, first, because a serious policy response to the 
problem addressed within one regime has inevitable consequences for the 
performance of the other one. This is virtually what Young et al. (1999: 50) 
call "functional linkage", namely the occurrence of 'facts of life' "in the 
sense that the operation of one institution directly influences the 
effectiveness of another through some substantive connection of the 
activities involved". Second, cases following a functional logic may arise 
from the fact that governance of distinct issue-areas in separate institutions 
inevitably separates the related norm-molding processes. Institutional 
fragmentation diverts attention from externalities generated by these 
solutions and supports the uncoordinated development of policy solutions. 
In the top left box (1.1), we find cases that are driven by a functional 
logic and produce synergy effects. For example, the phase-out of CFCs 
agreed upon within the ozone regime automatically supports the objective of 
the climate change regime because CFCs are also important greenhouse 
gases (Oberthiir 2001). This effect may be explained without reference to the 
(minor) variation of membership of the two global regimes. Cases of this 
type are largely unproblematic for the target regime. They enhance its 
effectiveness without producing additional costs. 
In contrast, the bottom left box (1.2) contains cases driven by a 
functional logic that produce effects running counter to the policy objective 
of the target" regime. For example. WTO/GATT has been established to 
promote a freer world trade and reduce trade obstacles, whereas several 
environmental regimes include arrangements that restrict international trade 
in certain goods, or that use the threat of trade sanctions to enforce 
environmental obligations like the ozone regime. Accordingly, the largely 
identical membership of these regimes is faced with a trade-off between 
their goal of pursuing environmental protection by means of establishing 
selective trade restrictions, and their goal of freer trade (for some of the rich 
literature on this subject see Lang 1993, Petersmann 1993, Moltke 1997). 
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1.1 functional synergy 
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Figure 10.1. Situation-specific causes and effects of regime interaction. 
Minor differences in membership are not relevant for the causal pathway 
that links the regimes involved. Cases of this type create demand for 
response action. They are readily recognizable because they stir conflict 
between regimes and have been the major focus of academic interest so far. 
Located on the right side of Figure 10.1 are cases driven by a logic of 
membership. Their core characteristic is that different groups of actors 
operate within the same issue-area. While the functional logic may be based 
upon some natural law or 'objective' trade-off between different goals, the 
logic of membership is the exclusive product of the social construction of 
institutional boundaries. Memberships of the regimes involved may 
completely overlap, so that a smaller group of actors forms a part of a larger 
group as in the case of a regional and a global regime operating in the same 
issue-area. They may also be mutually exclusive as in the case of two 
regimes addressing the same substantive problem in different regions of the 
world, or they may partly overlap. In all these cases it is the interplay 
between the groups of actors involved that constitutes the source of regime 
interaction. 
In the top right box (1.3) we find cases of interaction driven by a logic of 
membership that generate synergy effects. For example, the rapid 
development of the global Basel regime on the transboundary movement of 
hazardous wastes may be attributed to the establishment of several regional 
arrangements operating within the same issue-area because the number of 
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outlets for legal waste exports to the south was significantly reduced and the 
constellation of interests within the global regime thereby affected (Meinke 
2002). Interaction of this type is clearly attributed to the interplay between 
the groups of actors involved, rather than the (minor) differences of the 
substantive issue-areas governed by the actual regimes. It may create space 
for additional action within the original source regime. 
Finally, in the bottom right box (1.4) we find cases driven by a logic of 
membership that creates disruption within the target regime. For example, 
the interaction between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was dominated by their 
mutually exclusive membership, while they operated in virtually the same 
subject area. Disruption will generally create demand for suitable response 
action, although the ability of target regime members to react may be 
limited. If response action takes place within the original target regime, it 
may well produce its own externalities that affect the original source regime 
negatively. As a result, we may expect a process of co-evolution. 
The distinctions between types of regime interaction according to causes 
and effects draw attention to the fact that regime interaction may not only be 
driven by a functional logic that is emphasized by much of the current 
empirical literature. It may also be driven by a logic of membership that is 
generated entirely by the human construction of regime boundaries. 
Moreover, it may not necessarily produce only conflict but also synergy. 
Moreover, all four situation-specific types of regime interaction can be 
illustrated by well-known examples and are thus empirically relevant. 
2.1.1 Nature of Source Regime Action 
Considering the fact that every case of regime interaction is caused by 
action within the source regime, we may expect that the nature of source 
regime action sheds light on some other important aspects of an interaction 
case that are not illuminated by its situation-specific dimensions. Hence, we 
must identify dimensions in which source regime action varies significantly 
in ways that provide important information about a case of interaction. Once 
again, we propose two important distinctions: one relating to the influence of 
source regime action on the target regime and the other to the motivation of 
source regime action. 
The ability of source regime actors to unilaterally influence the target 
regime may be expected to have an immediate impact on the causal pathway 
at work. If this ability is high, source regime action will cause a consequence 
without consent, or even action, of the target regime actors. In contrast, if the 
source regime is not able to influence the target regime unilaterally, effective 
interaction will inevitably depend on consent and action by target regime 
actors. There are different causal pathways at work, depending on the ability 
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of source regime actors to exert unilateral influence. Hence, we derive an 
important conceptual distinction between cases that rely on the ability of 
source regime actors to influence the target regime unilaterally and cases 
that depend on consent of target regime actors. 
Another important aspect is whether the effects on the target regime are 
intended by source regime actors or not. The actors of the source regime may 
intend to bring about interaction, but in many cases they do not. 
Intentionality must be kept separate from anticipation. Unintended regime 
interaction may or may not have been anticipated. If anticipated, unintended 
regime interaction was not avoided because the costs of doing so were 
considered higher than the benefits. If unanticipated, effects come about as a 
surprise, although they might have been possible to anticipate at closer 
inspection (Martin/Simmons 1998). It does not seem to matter immediately 
for the causal pathway leading from source regime action to the effect, 
whether externalities were intended or not. However, if we assume that the 
intentionality of source regime action may be relevant for the kind of 
response, this distinction will be important. We may hypothesize, for 
example, that unintended interaction will more easily become subject to 
inter-regime coordination than intended action, because source regime actors 
will be prepared to search for a common solution. On the other hand, it will 
be easier to identify reliable solutions for intended cases of interaction, 
because they tend to depend exclusively on human action. 
By combining the dimensions of intentionality and ability to exert 
unilateral influence, we again derive four types of regime interaction (see 
Fi gure 10.2). In the top left box (2.1) we find cases in which the members of 
a source regime intend to affect another regime and are able to do so. For 
example, a number of European countries agreed in 1990 to abolish police 
checks at their internal borders. The members of this so-called Schengen 
regime intended to influence the related policy of the European 
Communities that had been in stalemate for several years, and they were 
able to do so successfully (Gehring 1998). In cases of this type, the members 
of the source regime control the interaction situation almost entirely. They 
employ the source regime as an instrument to influence the target regime. 
They will have little reason to negotiate with target regime actors about 
changes of their policy. 
The bottom left box (2.2) contains cases in which the actors are capable 
of unilaterally producing effects on the target regime while not intending to 
do so. A case in point is the interaction between GATT/WTO and 
environmental regimes that comprise trade restrictions. The actors 
negotiating the Montreal Protocol were able to decide unilaterally that trade 
sanctions be imposed on non-compliant countries. They created tension 
within the trade regime, but they did not do so in order to influence GATT. 
EXPLORING REGIME INTERACTION 261 
intentionality 




2.2 unintended side-effect 
2.3 request for change 
no 
2.4 provision of policy model 
3 
Figure 10.2. Nature of source regime action. 
In these cases, interaction depends exclusively on source regime action. In 
contrast to the instrumental use of regimes, source regime actors do not 
entirely control the situation because the generation of externalities occurs 
involuntarily. We may expect a greater preparedness to negotiate with target 
regime actors, but also difficulties to actually resolve the issue to the 
satisfaction of both sides. 
Cases at the right side of Figure 10.2 are characterized by a low ability or 
even inability of source regime actors to unilaterally influence the target 
regime. In the top right box (2.3) we find cases in which source regime 
actors nevertheless clearly intend to influence the target regime by 
requesting the latter to change. For example, the ozone regime's Montreal 
Protocol requires close control of trade in ozone-depleting substances and 
products containing these substances. Control is executed predominantly by 
customs officials. Members of the ozone regime desired to modify the 
Harmonized System of customs codes of the World Customs Organization 
(WCO) according to their needs. As they intended to change the customs 
codes, but could not impose modifications, they had to ask WCO to adapt 
(Oberthiir 2001). Note that interaction requires that the request for change is 
reacted to in some way by the members of the target regime. Arising 
intentionally, this type of interaction is characterized by action within both 
the target regime and the source regime. It is based on communication, most 
probably negotiations, between the two memberships involved. 
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The bottom right box (2.4) contains cases in which the source regime 
members are not able to influence the target regime, nor do they intend to do 
so. Even under these circumstances, a regime may unintentionally exert 
influence by providing an innovative policy model that the actors of the 
target regime take over voluntarily. A widely discussed example is the 
diffusion of the Montreal Protocol's non-compliance procedure to several 
other international environmental regimes. This non-compliance procedure 
was neither invented in order to influence other regimes, nor could it be 
imposed on other regimes. Nevertheless, it had a considerable impact on the 
development of several other regimes (Victor et al. 1998). Interaction of this 
type is entirely controlled by the target regime. It takes place through a 
causal pathway that is frequently called 'learning' or 'policy diffusion'. 
The distinctions related to the nature of source regime action draw 
attention to the fact that regime interaction is not necessarily a phenomenon 
of unintended externalities, as emphasized by the majority of the current 
literature on regime interaction. Regime interaction may well be intended by 
source regime actors. Even more noteworthy, interaction may occur also in 
cases in which source regime action alone is not able to generate influence. 
Hence, these distinctions uncover 'soft' types of interaction that depend on 
positive reaction from within the target regime to become effective and 
frequently remain altogether unnoticed. 
2.1.2 Consequences 
Source regime action will always have some consequence in the target 
regime or within the issue-area governed by it. Without a consequence, there 
would be no influence and, thus, no regime interaction. Differences in 
consequences have so far attracted remarkably little attention within the 
literature on regime interaction. The few typologies of consequences existing 
in the literature on regime interaction (see King 1997: 18) have not allowed 
for the formulation of hypotheses because they do not refer to causal 
pathways. 
First of all, it does not need further explication that information about the 
nature of the consequences caused by a case of interaction will be highly 
useful. Consequences will always occur either within the target regime or 
within the issue-area governed by it. However, they may come about in two 
distinct forms which are immediately related to different causal pathways. In 
some cases, consequences occur at the outcome level through behavioral 
changes of relevant actors that affect the target regime's performance. If 
source regime action causes relevant actors to adapt their behavior 
individually, the consequence arises outside the institutional framework of 
the target regime (extra-institutional adaptation). In contrast, the 
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consequence of an interaction may also occur within the target regime itself, 
i.e. at the output level, (intra-institutional adaptation). In these cases, source 
regime action causes the members of the target regime to modify the 
institution, usually by amending its norms (see Figure 10.3). 
extra-institutional intra-institutional 
adaptation adaptation 
Figure 10.3. Consequences. 
This distinction is immediately related to the causal pathways at work. In 
the first case, adaptation involves unilateral action of relevant states and non-
state actors outside the regime itself, while in the second case it is channeled 
through an institutionalized communication process. If consequences occur 
in the form of intra-institutional adaptation, interaction is dependent on the 
consent of the target regime actors. Although source regime action may 
change the decision situation of target regime actors, interaction cannot 
come about against the will of these actors. It may thus be hypothesized that 
interaction of this sort will not be highly disruptive. In contrast, extra-
institutional adaptation located at the outcome level occurs 'behind the back' 
of the target regime members without their consent. It is thus not only less 
visible and may even go unnoticed by both practitioners and scientific 
observers. It may also easily generate disruptive effects on the performance 
of the target regime that may be difficult to thwart by action of the target 
regime itself. 
For example, the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer affects the 
behavior of states and non-state actors related to the production and use of 
ozone-depleting substances, including CFCs. As CFCs are also greenhouse 
gases, the Protocol simultaneously affects behavior of state and non-state 
actors that is relevant to the performance of the climate change regime. This 
effect occurs without a modification of the rules of, or any other action 
within, the target regime. Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol provides incentives 
to maximize carbon sequestration by forests, thus endangering the 
achievement of the objectives of sustainable forest management pursued 
under the Convention on Biological Diversity. The consequence of the 
interaction in the target regime again consists in extra-institutional 
behavioral adaptations by relevant actors (e.g. investments in mono-cultural 
tree plantations). 
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In contrast, if the parties to the Montreal Protocol request that the World 
Customs Organization adapt its system of customs codes to the needs of the 
ozone regime, interaction does not result in relevant extra-institutional 
behavioral adaptations. Instead, it requires intra-institutional adaptation by 
the World Customs Organization itself through modification of the latter's 
customs codes. Likewise, the influence of the Montreal Protocol's non-
compliance procedure on the Kyoto Protocol manifested itself in the rules of 
the latter's compliance system. It did not require a modification of the 
behavior of any state or non-state actor outside the institutional framework 
of the climate change regime. 
The distinction between two different forms of consequences is important 
for distinguishing two fundamentally different causal pathways leading from 
the source to the target regime. First, interaction may lead to behavioral 
changes of relevant actors within the issue-area governed by the target 
regime but outside its institutional framework. Such extra-institutional 
adaptation may occur independently from members of the target regime. In 
contrast, intra-institutional adaptation requires a collective decision taken 
within the institutional framework of the target regime and therefore depends 
on the consent of members of the target regime. 
2.1.3 Responses to Interaction 
Frequently, actors relevant to the operation of either the source or the 
target regime, or both, respond to an interaction in order to mitigate adverse, 
or to enhance synergistic, effects. It is important to clearly distinguish 
response action from the original consequences of a case of interaction. 
Whereas the original consequences constitute an essential element of every 
case of regime interaction, subsequent response action does not. It is only 
present in some, but not in all cases, and it is always intended to modify the 
original consequence. 
In many cases of interaction, there is no response action at all. We may 
expect that this is particularly true for cases in which the original 
consequence of an interaction is beneficial for the target regime. In these 
cases, actors may tend simply to consume this additional benefit without 
engaging in further efforts to respond actively. For example, the benefits to 
the climate change regime of the phasing out of CFCs under the Montreal 
Protocol did not require any further action. While actors might respond to an 
interaction in order to enhance existing synergies, avoidance or mitigation of 
disruptive effects may be expected to figure more prominently since they 
disturb actors. 
If response action occurs, it may take different forms. Response action 
may rely upon collective decision-making within one of the institutions 
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involved or it may take place beyond their confines. If individual actors 
respond unilaterally to the consequences of an interaction, response will take 
place outside of any of the institutions involved. If the original consequences 
of an interaction motivate the members of the target or the source regime to 
modify the institution, for example by amending regime norms, the response 
involves collective decision-making within the regimes. This distinction is 
important because it establishes two forms of response action that display 
fundamentally different conditions. In one case, response action involves 
unilateral decisions by individual states and non-state actors, while in the 
other it is a collective decision resulting from an institutionalized 
communication process. 
Another distinction refers to the relevance of coordination between the 
regimes involved. Generally, response may be based upon isolated action 
occurring within one of the regimes or one of the issue-areas governed by 
them, or it may rely on explicit coordination between the two regimes 
involved. In the former case, an overarching communication process does 
not exist. In the latter case, however, the response includes an additional 
communication process that overarches the two regimes, e.g. in the form of 
an exchange of the relevant secretariats, negotiations between the two 
groups of actors or even court decision-making. In this case, we have what 
Young et al. (1999: 50) call a "political linkage" that arises "when actors 
decide to consider two or more arrangements as parts of a larger institutional 
complex". 
By combining these two distinctions, we derive another two-dimensional 
matrix distinguishing types of response action (Figure 10.4). At the left side 
we find cases without explicit coordination between regimes. The bottom 
left box (4.2) contains cases in which the response does not involve any 
collective decision-making within either of the regimes involved, or in the 
form of coordination between the source and the target regime. In these 
cases, relevant state and non-state actors respond individually. Interested 
states and, subsequently, non-state actors may be inclined to respond 
independently, for example to mitigate disruptive effects of desired policies. 
especially in cases in which collective response action is lacking. Thus, 
countries may enact domestic regulation on the use of ozone-friendly HFCs 
promoted under the Montreal Protocol because of the detrimental effect of 
these substances on the global climate. 
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Figure 10.4. Nature of response action. 
The top left box (4.1) contains cases in which responses occur through 
uncoordinated collective decision-making within either of the regimes. Such 
intra-institutional responses require sufficient agreement between regime 
members and appropriate procedures and institutional structures for 
collective decision-making that are usually available in modern international 
regimes. Thus, this form of response action may be assumed to be relatively 
wide-spread. Target regime members have a particularly strong incentive to 
act either to avoid disruption or to enhance synergy. However, the source 
regime will frequently be more capable of acting because it triggered the 
original consequence in the first place. Especially in situations in which side-
effects occur unintentionally, source regime actors may be inclined to act. 
For example, rules are currently developed under the Kyoto Protocol to 
counter its potentially disruptive effect on sustainable forest management 
promoted by the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
The right side of Figure 10.4 addresses cases of interaction in which 
responses are coordinated between the regimes involved. Such inter-
institutional coordination is the most demanding form of responses as it 
requires some overarching institutional framework in which collective 
decisions can be taken. Accordingly, cases will concentrate in the top right 
box (4.3), while the bottom right box (4.4) remains empty because 
coordinated responses always require collective decision-making. Inter-
institutional responses are comparatively rare. They will be particularly 
relevant in situations involving regimes that are 'nested' within a broader 
institution (on the notion of nested institutions see Young 1996: 2-3). For 
example, interaction between the various protocols to the 1979 Geneva 
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UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution may be 
made subject to collective decisions of the regime members in the 
responsible 'Executive Body'. Within the European Community conflicts of 
obligations may be solved by an authoritative decision of the European 
Court of Justice. However, inter-institutional coordination can also occur 
between regimes that are not nested. In some cases, regimes coordinate their 
responses in the form of inter-institutional agreements, memoranda of 
understanding, or other forms of contractual agreement. For example, the 
climate change regime and the Global Environment Facility agreed on the 
terms according to which the latter operates the financial mechanism for the 
former (see Fairman 1996; Werksman 1996). More frequently, institutions 
coordinate their activity in less binding ways, in particular by establishing 
mechanisms for the exchange of information. For example, the original 
request of the Montreal Protocol to the World Customs Organization to 
adapt the system of customs codes with respect to ozone-depleting 
substances has resulted, in addition to a number of relevant decisions in both 
forums, in a lively exchange of information between the two regimes (see 
Oberthiir 2001). Likewise, the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) has established extensive exchanges of information with a number 
of regimes for the conservation of nature as well as with the World Customs 
Organization and Interpol (CITES 1999). 
The two distinctions introduced here provide a starting point for 
evaluating the responses to regime interaction more systematically. Whether 
or not such responses involve collective decision-making or even 
coordination between the source and the target regime is important since 
collective decision-making and coordination between regimes open up 
particular capacities to mitigate conflict or enhance synergy between 
regimes. At the same time, achieving collective decision-making and 
coordination places special demands on the members of the regimes 
involved and may not always produce significant benefits. Whether these 
forms of response action become relevant will thus depend on the particular 
circumstances of the case. 
2.2 Toward Inductive Analysis of Regime Interaction 
While we have argued in Section 1 that complex interaction situations 
should be disaggregated into a number of limited cases, it turns out now that 
even these cases are highly complex social phenomena. According to the 
distinctions identified in the previous sub-section, every single case of 
interaction has different properties relating to its situation-specific causes 
and effects, to the nature of source regime action and to the consequences 
and responses. Evidently, these distinctions are not the only ones worth 
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exploring and others may be added in the future. However, we submit that 
they embody critical factors because they are relevant to the causal pathways 
that drive regime interaction. They may thus be taken as a sound starting 
point for advancing research on regime interaction in a systematic manner. 
The set of distinctions provides instruments for two sorts of research, namely 
the empirical mapping of cases and the inductive generation of classes of 
regime interaction. 
First of all, the distinctions introduced here may be employed as a 
checklist when investigating cases of regime interaction. They point to a 
number of important dimensions of each case and provide criteria for the 
generation of case "profiles". It has to be noted, however, that each of me 
distinctions confronts two mutually exclusive ideal types. Real world cases 
will frequently be of a hybrid nature. For example, interaction between the 
river Rhine regime and the regime for the protection of the North Sea might 
be driven by a functional logic as these institutions govern clearly different 
subject areas that are, nevertheless, substantively linked. However, their 
memberships also differ significantly, suggesting a logic of membership. 
Similarly, it may not always be easy to decide whether a source regime was 
able to influence the target regime unilaterally, since this may be a matter of 
degree. A researcher intending to merely classify empirical cases according 
to the dimensions developed above may thus decide to turn the bi-polar 
distinctions into continua. Accordingly, interaction may be located 
somewhere in the middle between the extremes in mixed cases. However, 
before pragmatic solutions of this sort are pursued, researchers should check 
whether disaggregating further the interaction phenomenon in question 
would resolve the issue (see Section 2). 
Second, the distinctions developed may be employed as an instrument for 
the exploration of dominant patterns of regime interaction. By combining 
some dimensions of regime interaction, we have made the first step towards 
a multidimensional typology of cases. Altogether, the distinctions establish 
numerous possible classes of regime interaction. We may expect that several 
of these classes will be virtually unpopulated, while cases will concentrate in 
others. For example, one might hypothesize that cases driven by a functional 
logic are strongly correlated with unintended source state action. But is this 
true for functional synergy too? Furthermore, do cases driven by a functional 
logic lead more often than cases driven by a logic of membership to inter-
institutional coordination, and does intentionality systematically influence 
this variation? Questions of this type will eventually enable us to develop 
dominant types of regime interaction with similar properties. If complex 
situations are sufficiently disaggregated and the number of cases is high 
enough, even systematic application of quantitative methods may become 
possible. As categories are designed so as to indicate different causal 
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pathways at work, inductively derived patterns of cases of interaction might 
serve as a basis for hypothesizing about causal connections between the 
different dimensions distinguished, and for elaborating theoretically well-
founded causal mechanisms (see Section 3.2). 
3. ADVANCING CAUSAL ANALYSIS OF REGIME 
INTERACTION 
Detection and mapping of possible cases of regime interaction is an 
important step in the process of evaluating the interaction pattern of a given 
situation. However, a case may only be established by demonstrating 
causality through the identification of causal pathways (3.1). This may 
provide the basis for developing generalized causal mechanisms in the 
future. Going beyond the standardization of causal pathways, such 
mechanisms would spell out the conditions under which they become 
operational (3.2). 
3.1 Establishing Causality 
The core task of an empirical analysis of regime interaction is to identify, 
separately for every case, the existence of an actual chain of influence 
between the regimes involved. Since quantitative or statistical methods for 
causal analysis of interaction situations seem to be largely out of reach at the 
present state of knowledge, cases of interaction need to be treated basically 
as single events that are independent of each other. Establishing causality 
then involves addressing at least two issues, namely the selection of the 
appropriate empirical methods based on a clear understanding of the 
underlying concept of agency and the identification of a causal pathway. 
First, researchers aiming at establishing causality in cases of regime 
interaction may employ a number of well-known empirical methods. One 
important method is the tracing of negotiation and decision processes (see 
George/McKeown 1985). It will be particularly relevant for analyzing cases 
that operate at the output level and thus result in consequences within the 
target regime itself (see Section 2.1.3). In this case, process tracing can 
reveal important information about whether or not the decision of target 
regime actors to modify their institution was motivated by the source regime. 
Frequently, however, it will prove difficult to establish on this basis that 
decision-making in the target regime was not driven by other factors, such as 
technical progress. Therefore, process tracing is best complemented by other 
methods, that may also be employed for establishing causality in cases of 
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interaction that operate at the outcome level and generate consequences in 
the form of extra-institutional adaptation (see Section 2.1.3). An important 
and well-known method for establishing causality is the construction of 
counterfactual scenarios (Tetlock/Belkin 1996, Bierstecker 1993, Fearon 
1991). This method addresses the hypothetical question of how the target 
regime and the issue-area governed by it would have developed in the 
absence of the source regime. A reliable counterfactual scenario disclosing 
major differences to the actual development will firmly establish causal 
influence. However, the construction of a reliable counterfactual scenario 
frequently proves impossible because of the many intervening factors that 
have to be taken into consideration. This will be especially true if the 
scenario stretches over a longer period of time. Therefore, this method may 
be complemented by the exclusion of alternative explanations (Bernauer 
1995), i.e by exploring the question of whether factors other than the source 
regime might convincingly explain the observed change in, or effect on, the 
target institution. These methods are so widely applied in the well-advanced 
research on the simple effectiveness of international regimes (Underdal in 
this volume) that they need no further elaboration here. 
Thought experiments and counterfactual scenarios model actors' 
behavior in virtual situations and depend, therefore, on assumptions about 
how actors might behave in general. Due to the complexity of the real world, 
researchers will also have to distinguish between actors that are deemed 
relevant for a particular pathway and those that are not. They will have to 
draw a line between relevant action to be taken into account and less 
relevant action that might be ignored. In addition, empirical data required for 
a plausible explanation will frequently be inaccessible or lacking and must 
be substituted or complemented with conceptually plausible speculation. In 
short, causal analysis requires - at least implicitly - a theory of action. 
Rational utility maximization is probably the concept most widely 
employed in empirical studies that explore causal pathways - even though 
empirical work does usually not make this assumption explicit. The 
analytical power of the rational actor model stems from the fact that it 
provides a useful theoretical foundation for exploring the behavior of actors 
in undetermined situations. This is most important in situations of change in 
which more than one viable option exists. Consider a situation in which the 
African countries endeavor to close their continent for waste exports. We 
may want to employ a theoretically informed thought experiment to 
investigate how waste producing industries and waste brokers might react. 
Will they stop waste exports? Doing so would cause high investment for 
industries and drive brokers out of business. Or will they try to side-step the 
African ban? They may attempt to do so depending on the ability of the 
African countries to implement their regional regime. Or will they attempt to 
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find alternative outlets for their waste? If successful, it might be the cheapest 
and least complicated option. Engaging in this type of reasoning, researchers 
implicitly ask: Which of a number of available options will best serve the 
interests of these actors and may thus be expected to be chosen by them? 
Asking this question is based upon the assumption that the actors intend to 
maximize their utility, that is, choose the option that ranks highest in their 
order of preferences. Causal analysis cannot avoid engaging in thought 
experiments of this type. 
Institution A -> Institution B 
• 
modified decision- changed 
situation behavior 
Figure 10.5. Model of a Causal Pathway 
Second, causation will be difficult to establish without the identification 
of the causal pathway that is capable of bringing about an observed change. 
The empirical phenomenon of regime interaction is located at the collective 
("system") level. We endeavor to identify cases in which one social 
institution influences another social institution. However, an international 
regime is not an actor (at least not in the traditional sense), and it is 
definitely not capable of affecting the target regime directly. If a source 
regime affects a target regime, influence will always be channeled through 
some causal pathway that involves action by non-institutional actors located 
at some lower ("unit") level. Accordingly, establishing causality means to 
link occurrences located at the institutional (aggregate) level with 
developments located at the actors' level (see Hovi in this volume). The 
basic model of causal explanation of social (aggregate level) events is 
illustrated in Figure 10.5. 
Explanation by causal pathways combines a logic of the situation with a 
theory of action and a logic of aggregation of actors' behavior (see Coleman 
1990- 1-23) Accordingly, identification of a causal pathway that links a 
source regime with a target regime comprises three major steps. First, we 
have to establish how an important component of the source regime (or its 
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anticipation) may affect the decision situation of relevant actors. Second, we 
must prove that the modification of the decision situation results in a change 
of their individual behavior. And third, we must demonstrate that these 
behavioral changes produce the effect observed within the target regime (see 
Esser 1993: 39-63). For example, we may want to establish that the 
Schengen regime on the abolition of border controls for persons interacted 
with, i.e. causally influenced, the European Union's related policy. In this 
case, we will have to demonstrate that the establishment of the regime 
significantly modified the decision situation of relevant actors, for example 
because it forced non-parties to choose between participation and abstention. 
We will then have to establish that changes in individual behavior of 
relevant actors may be attributed to the modified decision situation, for 
example that some originally hesitant countries joined the regime because 
they disliked isolation. Finally, we will have to demonstrate that the 
aggregate consequences of these behavioral changes paved the way for the 
development of the Union's Third Pillar (justice and home affairs), that 
opposition against a largely identical European policy diminished because of 
increased participation in the Schengen regime. 
While this strategy for the identification of a causal pathway is applicable 
to all instances of interaction, cases will differ as to the actual pathways of 
influence at work over the whole causal chain. Pathways may involve 
different types of actors and behavior. Effects observed within the target 
regime will frequently be attributable to changes in the behavior of key 
states. However, other types of actors may play an important role in a causal 
pathway. For example, waste producing industries and waste brokers will 
play a major part in the explanation of influence of the ban of imports of 
hazardous wastes to Africa on the emergence of other regional waste import 
regimes. The actual - or even anticipated - change in behavior of non-state 
actors will modify the decision situation of potentially affected countries in 
other regions if they realize the emergence or aggravation of an 
environmental problem that did not require action so far. It may induce them 
to establish their own regional protection regime. Non-governmental 
organizations and institutional actors such as secretariats of international 
institutions may also constitute important actors. Given the diversity of 
possible cases of interaction, the relevance of varying types of actors will 
largely depend on the circumstances of the individual case. In most cases, 
research is best initiated with a focus on key states (or groups of states) 
because these actors are frequently most influential in bringing about 
changes within the target regime. Sub-state and non-state actors may be 
added to the analysis depending on the particular case at hand. They may be 
given more prominent status in the case of interaction involving 
'transnational regimes' (Haufler 1993). 
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Finally, it should be noted that actors generally 'behave' in two distinct 
forms. They act outside the institutional framework of the regimes involved, 
for example shipping waste from one country to another or allowing their 
fishermen to catch whales. They may also act within an institutional 
framework, for example by modifying a negotiation position or instigating 
dispute settlement proceedings, if available. Depending on the particular 
case of interaction and on the specific causal pathway at work, research may 
have to focus on the domestic level or on the institutionalized international 
process. For instance, if a request for change from the side of the source 
regime leads to intra-institutional adaptation, and possibly to intra- or inter-
institutional responses, most of the analysis will concentrate on the 
international institutional level. In contrast, if source regime action leads to 
disruptive effects at the level of domestic implementation and does not 
trigger collective policy responses, most of the analysis will have to address 
the national level. 
3.2 Generalized Causal Mechanisms 
Eventually we may want to reach beyond the empirical assessment of 
cases of regime interaction and the causal explanation of empirically 
observed pathways of influence. We require generalized knowledge if we 
intend to generate hypotheses as to what kind of interaction is to be expected 
in a given situation, or under which conditions a particular type of 
interaction is probable, or which policy responses may prove particularly 
effective under given circumstances. If we are not satisfied by the correlation 
between different types of situation and their effects, but want to know why 
an observed effect comes about in a particular situation, we must identify 
generalized causal mechanisms. A generalized causal mechanism combines 
a causal chain that brings about an effect in the target regime with the 
identification of conditions under which this causal chain becomes effective 
or is likely to become effective. While it reaches beyond an empirically 
established causal pathway, it may well be based on inductively generated 
patterns of regime interaction (see Section 2.2) that may provide a starting 
point for hypothesizing about causal connections between the different 
dimensions of regime interaction. The development of generalized causal 
mechanisms may eventually provide a kit of standard forms of interaction 
(Schilling 1978, Hovi in this volume) that might serve as analytical tools. 
much like the familiar standard game theoretic situations help analyze 
problems of cooperation under anarchy. 
There has been some endeavor to develop a generalized causal 
mechanism for one particular type of regime interaction, namely the 
instrumental use of a "minilateral" regime by a comparatively small number 
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of interested actors to influence or replace a larger multilateral regime 
governing the same issue-area. Genschel and Plumper (1997) explored why 
the establishment of a minilateral regime generates a dynamic that gradually 
affects the existing larger regime in some cases but not in others. Their 
general answer is that such a dynamic is likely to occur if (a) the group of 
initiators is able to cooperate without participation of other actors (otherwise 
the process could not be expected to start), and (b) the incentive for a free 
rider to abstain from cooperation decreases with every additional cooperator. 
In this case, the advantage of abstaining (and free riding) diminishes 
gradually and may eventually even turn into a disadvantage. Situations of 
this type have the potential for self-sustained growth. For example, joining 
the Schengen regime on the abolition of police controls at the internal 
borders in Europe became more attractive with every additional member 
(Gehring 1998). The Schengen regime thus heavily influenced the related 
EU policy. In contrast, if the advantage of abstaining and taking a free ride 
for a non-cooperating actor increases with every additional cooperator, the 
growth of the minilateral regime is likely to stop at a rather early stage, and 
it is therefore unlikely to replace the larger regime. 
The formulation of such generalized causal mechanisms may be expected 
to advance our understanding of regime interaction considerably. It is still 
too early to outline a research program that would allow the development of 
generalized causal mechanisms - not least because of the low level of 
systematic empirical knowledge about types and patterns of interaction 
between regimes (see Section 2.2). However, such a program would be 
directed at inquiring into the systematic modification of incentive structures 
inducing relevant actors to adjust their behavior. A (moderate) rational 
actors' perspective (see Section 3.1) seems to be particularly well suited for 
this task. Advancing theoretical research in this direction might enable us 
one day to make general statements about the dynamics of functional 
conflict, or the conditions under which voluntary adoption of institutional 
arrangements from another regime becomes possible, or the prerequisites 
under which interaction is responded to by collective decision-making or 
inter-institutional coordination. Knowledge of this type would be of 
considerable value for the development of institutional designs that might 
prevent undesirable, and enhance desirable, interaction. 
4. CONCLUSION 
International regimes do not exist in isolation from one another. They co-
exist within the international system and increasingly exert influence on each 
other's development and performance. In light of the growing number of 
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formally independent international regimes, interaction between regimes has 
already attracted considerable interest of both scholars and policy-makers. 
Much of the research on regime interaction has been motivated by concern 
about the detrimental impact of such interaction on the effectiveness of the 
regimes involved, in particular in the field of environmental protection. In 
this respect, it constitutes an offspring of the policy-relevant research focus 
on regime effectiveness that flourished in the past decade. However, 
research on regime interaction has not yet been based on an elaborate 
conceptual foundation, and it is not yet guided by theoretical ambition. 
This paper aims to contribute to the filling of this conceptual gap. It 
develops a systematic framework for the analysis of regime interaction that 
may become the core of a structured research program. The framework 
avoids limiting attention to particular (kinds of) cases of interaction or 
specific pathways of influence. Instead, it is intended to facilitate the 
exploration and mapping of cases of interaction. Empirical knowledge 
gained on this basis promises to provide a basis for identifying particular 
patterns of regime interaction and developing a typology of cases of 
interaction, which would constitute the first step towards identifying causal 
mechanisms and a theory of regime interaction. 
In investigating regime interaction, researchers are faced with situations 
that are characterized by high degrees of complexity. Frequently, a situation 
involves two regimes that are themselves sufficiently complex to interact in 
more than a single way, or it comprises a co-evolution process that develops 
over time, or it entails interaction among a whole set of regimes. Under these 
conditions, interaction may appear to go forth and back between the regimes 
involved without a clear direction of influence, or it may rely on different 
causal pathways. In order to gain analytical rigor and reach beyond the mere 
description of a complex situation, we propose to take as the units of 
analysis cases of interaction that are characterized by a clear direction of 
influence running from a single source regime toward a single target regime. 
Disaggregating complex overall situations into an appropriate number of 
cases allows us to examine the causal pathways at work and to identify the 
particular features of a case. It thus promises to generate a clearer picture of 
the situation as a whole than an overall analysis. 
Furthermore, an important task at the present stage of research is the 
systematic analysis and mapping of cases. While overall interaction 
situations may be readily identifiable, cases of interaction will frequently be 
hidden if they do not stir open conflict between regimes or require action by 
the policy-makers involved. Therefore, researchers must have a 
preconceived idea of possible types of interaction and their appearance. The 
present framework of analysis introduces seven important dimensions of 
regime interaction. It draws the attention of the empirical researcher to the 
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broadness of the field of regime interaction and allows him to capture even 
cases of interaction which policy-makers may be unaware of. Based on a 
systematic empirical mapping of cases, it may be possible to derive 
inductively a more sophisticated typology of cases (and possibly of different 
causal pathways) that could provide the basis for the elaboration of 
conceptually more demanding causal mechanisms. 
Finally, regime interaction is limited to cases of actual (and anticipated) 
influence between regimes. Therefore, causality has to be demonstrated. The 
application of variation-finding or statistical methods does not seem to be 
appropriate at the present stage of knowledge. Therefore, demonstration of 
causality will have to rely on the application of qualitative methods of causal 
inference and the establishment of causal pathways that plausibly link source 
regimes with target regimes and their issue-areas. The exploration of a 
causal pathway will always refer to the behavior of relevant actors at a lower 
level. The systematic search for causal pathways related to different types of 
regime interaction promises to provide the necessary basis for the future 
development of generalized causal mechanisms. Beyond specifying 
particular patterns of regime interaction, such generalized mechanisms 
would indicate under which conditions they occur. They would thus offer a 
tool-kit for the analysis of interaction situations much like the standard game 
theoretical situations do for the exploration of collective action problems. 
Theoretical and conceptually well-founded knowledge about the causes 
and consequences of regime interaction will be highly relevant to policy-
making. It promises to assist the development of policies that help prevent 
conflict and enhance synergy between regimes. It generates insights into 
particularly effective political responses and enhances our understanding of 
the conditions under which linkages between regimes and their issue-areas 
may be employed to effectively pursue political objectives. Thus, research 
based on the framework of analysis laid out here not only promises to 
advance our theoretical understanding of regime interaction, but will also 
help design effective institutional arrangements. 
NOTES 
A diversity of terms can be found in the literature to describe the phenomena dealt with 
here, lor example interplay, linkage, inter-linkage, overlap, and interconnection. 
Throughout this paper, we will use the term regime interaction. 
The paper also constitutes a contribution to the EU collaborative research project on 
"Institutional Interaction - How to Prevent Conflicts and Enhance Synergies between 
International and EU Environmental Institutions", funded under the EU research and 
technological development program "Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development" 
(Contract No. EVK2-CT2000-(XX)79). The authors are solely responsible for the contents 
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of the paper that does not represent the opinion of the European Community. We thank the 
project members, the editors of the book and, especially, Olav Schräm Stokke for their 
valuable comments. 
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